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INTRODUCTION
If the extent of the media coverage is the criterion, “the Trial of the
20th Century” was the California prosecution of O.J. Simpson for
murder in 1995.1 In both his opening statement and his closing
argument, defense counsel Johnny Cochran famously claimed that the
Los Angeles police had been guilty of “a rush to judgment.”2 Cochran
argued that reasonable doubt existed in part because the Los Angeles
police had failed to follow up on leads suggesting the guilt of third
parties other than Simpson. 3
That argument has a long pedigree. Perry Mason was the legendary
fictional defense attorney created by Earle Stanley Gardner.4 Perry not
only won all his cases—indeed, in most instances, he gained a dismissal
of the charges at the preliminary hearing. Even more impressively, he
won the acquittals by establishing that a third party had committed the
crime with which Perry’s client was charged. Before the conclusion of
every hearing, Perry’s trusty investigator, Paul Drake, always arrived at
the last moment and handed Perry a file containing the evidence
unmasking “the real culprit.” The Perry Mason novels and television
series helped popularize the Some Other Dude Did It (“SODDI”)
defense.
However, Perry was a fictional character who did not have to
surmount the evidentiary problems faced by defense attorneys in the
1. Joe Nelson, Veteran AP Reporter Linda Deutsch Had Front Row Seat to O.J. Simpson’s
“Trial of the Century,” WHITTIER DAILY NEWS (June 11, 2014, 8:28 PM), http://www.
whittierdailynews.com/arts-and-entertainment/20140611/veteran-ap-reporter-linda-deutsch-hadfront-row-seat-to-oj-simpsons-trial-of-the-century.
2. William Claiborne, Simpson Defense Decries “Rush to Judgment,” WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
1995, at A1; Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Simpson Defense Charges “Sinister” Rush to Judgment
Trial: Cochran Says in Opening Statement That Police Overlooked and Manufactured Evidence.
He Suggests That Blood Found on Nicole Simpson Points to Different Killer, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1995; CNN Transcripts: O.J. Simpson Trial, Day 157—Part 6, Aired at 9/27/95 6:40:00 PM,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/US/OJ/daily/9-28/transcripts/trans6.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015).
3. Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Simpson Offering $500,000 Reward for Tips in Case
Investigation: Defense Says Other Possible Suspects were Ignored, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1994.
4. See generally David McCord, “But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!”: The
Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That Some Else Is Guilty,
63 TENN. L. REV. 917 (1996); Brett C. Powell, Perry Mason Meets the “Legitimate Tendency”
Standard of Admissibility (and Doesn’t Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1023 (2001).
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real world. In most jurisdictions in the real world when a defense
attorney attempts to assay a SODDI defense, he or she encounters
substantial hurdles.5 Most jurisdictions subscribe to a special relevance
test, namely, the so-called “direct” or “clear” link standard.6 As we
shall see in Part I, if the defense wants to create reasonable doubt by
pointing the finger of guilt at a third party, the defense must present
more than evidence that the third party had a motive or opportunity to
commit the charged crime; rather, there must be substantial evidence
tying the third party to the actual commission or perpetration of the
charged offense.7 The defense not only has to marshal that quantum of
proof, to make matters worse, as Part II explains, the defense’s proof of
the third party’s guilt must satisfy both the hearsay rule and the
character evidence prohibition.8 In the real world, the defense rarely
prevails on a traditional SODDI defense.9 For that matter, unless the
defense counsel can overcome all these barriers, the trial judge might
not even instruct the jury on the defense.10
A 2006 capital murder case, Holmes v. South Carolina,11 might have
given the United States Supreme Court a chance to review the
constitutionality of these restrictions. The prosecution had substantial
evidence of Holmes’s guilt,12 including fingerprints, fiber analysis, and
DNA evidence.13 Holmes not only argued negatively that the forensic
evidence was flawed, Holmes also affirmatively contended that the real
culprit was Jimmy McCaw White.14 The defense attempted to
introduce evidence that White had been in the neighborhood at the time
of the crime and that White had both admitted to committing the crime
and asserted that Holmes was “innocent.”15 However, at a pretrial
5. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, The Alternative Perpetrator Strategy, CRIM. JUST.
Winter 2003, at 32–34 (discussing the majority view).
6. Id. at 34.
7. See infra Part I (discussing the current split of authority over the requirements to assert the
SODDI defense).
8. See infra Part II (discussing the SODDI defense 2.0 in which the accused presents evidence
to show that the police failed to properly investigate the guilt of a third party who plausibly
committed the charged crime).
9. See the discussion of the unsuccessful SODDI defense in the California prosecution of
David Westerfield in Joy & McMunigal, supra note 5, at 32. The authors mention some of the
practical problems facing a defendant contemplating relying on a SODDI defense.
10. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891).
11. The original state supreme court opinion is State v. Holmes, 464 S.E.2d 334 (S.C. 1995).
On post-conviction review, Holmes obtained a new trial. State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19 (S.C.
2004). When the new trial resulted in a conviction, Holmes petitioned the Supreme Court.
12. Holmes, 464 S.E.2d at 333–34.
13. Id. at 334.
14. Id. at 336.
15. Id.
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hearing, after White denied the statements, the trial judge excluded the
evidence of White’s possible guilt of the charged crime.16 In doing so,
the trial judge relied on State v. Gregory,17 a South Carolina case
adopting a version of the “direct link” standard.18
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial
judge’s ruling and Holmes’s conviction.19 However, the supreme court
affirmed the ruling on a different rationale.20 The supreme court turned
to State v. Gay,21 a 2001 South Carolina precedent. The supreme court
read Gay as holding that where there is “strong evidence of an
appellant’s guilt—especially” when there is strong forensic evidence,
the proffered evidence about a third party’s alleged guilt does not raise a
reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s own innocence.22
The United States Supreme Court reversed.23 However, in part
because of the way the case was briefed before the Court, the Court did
not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the “direct link” test
prescribed by Gregory.24 Instead, the Court faulted the Gay approach to
assessing the probative value of the evidence of third-party guilt.25
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Alito declared, “by evaluating
the strength of only one party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be
reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other
side to rebut or cast doubt.”26 Although the Court reaffirmed the
accused’s general constitutional right to present critical exculpatory
evidence, the Court did not have occasion to comment on the validity of
the “direct link” restriction on that right. The upshot is that in most
jurisdictions today, that restriction continues to hinder defense counsel
who want to rely on a traditional SODDI defense.
However, in recent years the defense has evolved. Increasingly,
defense counsel are presenting a variation of the defense—the SODDI
defense 2.0. In a traditional SODDI defense, the accused tries to create
reasonable doubt by presenting admissible evidence of the third party’s
16. Id. at 338.
17. People v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 1941).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 536.
20. Id.
21. State v. Gay, 541 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 2001), abrogated by Holmes v. South Carolina, 547
U.S. 319 (2006).
22. State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 2005), overruled and vacated by Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
23. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
24. Id. at 324, 328–31.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 331.
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guilt of the charged offense. As we have seen, when the accused
invokes a traditional SODDI defense, the defense counsel must not only
present a certain quantum of proof.27 In addition, that proof must be
capable of running the admissibility gauntlets of the hearsay and
character rules.
In the emerging version of the defense, as in People v. Simpson, the
accused endeavors to generate reasonable doubt by making the more
limited argument that the police neglected to pursue plausible
investigative leads about third parties who might be the real culprit.28
The defense’s choice of this version of the SODDI defense has
important consequences. As Part II explains, the new variation of the
defense not only reduces the quantum of proof that the defense must
present to make out a submissible case for the jury; reliance on this
defense also eliminates the need for the defense testimony to satisfy the
hearsay and character exclusionary rules.29 Significantly, in two 2014
decisions, one federal30 and one state,31 the courts approved the SODDI
defense 2.0. Moreover, the courts, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and the Utah Court of Appeals, squarely held that
the trial judge’s exclusion of the testimony that the accused proffered to
substantiate the defense amounted to constitutional error, namely, a
violation of the accused’s constitutional right to present crucial
exculpatory evidence. Concededly, the Supreme Court has not
characterized a violation of that right as “structural” error, automatically
mandating reversal; rather to warrant reversal, the error must be
prejudicial.32 However, when the error is constitutional in nature,
Chapman v. California teaches that the prosecution must shoulder the
burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond any reasonable
doubt.33
The thesis of this Article is that the two 2014 decisions correctly
concluded that accused have a constitutional right to present a SODDI
2.0 defense. The first two Parts of the Article are descriptive. Part I
reviews the traditional SODDI defense, describes the quantum of proof
that the defense must present and explains why the defense must

27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Newton & Ford, supra note 3.
29. See infra Part II (describing the SODDI defense 2.0).
30. See generally Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 2014).
31. See generally State v. McCullar, 335 P.3d 900 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
32. See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (explaining that the courts
apply the “harmless error” test to see if the admission of such testimony is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt).
33. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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comply with the strictures of the hearsay and character rules when the
defense elects to rely on this version of the SODDI defense.34 Part II
compares and contrasts the new variation of the SODDI defense
demonstrating that a submissible case under SODDI 2.0 requires less
evidence of the third party’s guilt than under the traditional version.35
Distinguishing the two versions of the defense, Part II further elaborates
why the SODDI defense 2.0 obviates the need for the defense to dot the
i’s and cross the t’s of the hearsay rule and the character evidence
prohibition.36
Finally, Part III addresses the most serious objections to the SODDI
defense 2.0.37 One is the contention that unlike the traditional SODDI
defense, without more the SODDI defense 2.0 is incapable of
generating the reasonable doubt justifying an acquittal.38 The second
objection is that when there is seemingly a consensus that there should
be significant restrictions on the traditional SODDI defense, it is wrongminded to apply such minimal limitations to the SODDI defense 2.0.39
Part III considers, but ultimately rejects, both objections. The Article
concludes that the Second Circuit and Utah Court of Appeals reached
the correct result in upholding the SODDI defense 2.0 and freeing that
defense from the limitations constraining the traditional SODDI
defense.
I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SODDI DEFENSE
There is a split of authority over the requirements for mounting the
traditional SODDI defense based on evidence that a third party in fact
committed the charged crime.40
A. The Majority View
When the defense opts to present a traditional version of the SODDI

34. See infra Part I (discussing the current split of authority over the requirements to assert the
SODDI defense).
35. See infra Part II (discussing the SODDI defense 2.0 in which the accused presents
evidence to show that the police failed to properly investigate the guilt of a third party who
plausibly committed the charged crime).
36. See infra Part II.
37. See infra Part III (evaluating the legitimacy of the SODDI 2.0 defense).
38. See infra Part III.A (evaluating the objection prosecutors may raise for the SODDI 2.0
defense because the inferences made are too speculative to create reasonable doubt).
39. See infra Part III.B (evaluating the objection prosecutors may raise regarding the SODDI
2.0 defense because there are minimal requirements in order for it to be raised).
40. Compare State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988), with Joy & McMunigal, supra
note 5, at 34, and Zachary El-Sawaf, Comment, Incomplete Justice: Plugging the Hole Left by the
Reverse 404(b) Problem, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1049, 1051–52, 1055–60 (2012).
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defense, the defense counsel can present one or both of two types of
evidence.
1. Evidence of the Third Party’s Involvement in the Charged Crime
In 1891, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Alexander v.
United States.41 Alexander was charged with murdering his partner in a
livestock business.42 An eyewitness saw the two men riding together to
their camp.43 The witness then heard several gunshots.44 The witness
next saw the accused riding alone and leading a horse with no rider.45
At trial, the accused attempted to develop a traditional SODDI
defense.46 The accused wanted to present evidence that the decedent
had been having an affair with a married woman and the woman’s
husband had searched for the decedent—evidently motivated by a desire
for revenge.47 The trial judge ruled that even if the accused presented
all the proffered evidence, the evidence would not warrant instructing
the jury on a SODDI defense.48 The Supreme Court affirmed the
ruling.49 The Court reasoned that third-party evidence must have a
“legitimate tendency” to establish the third party’s guilt of the charged
crime.50 Although the proffered evidence tended to show that the
woman’s husband had a motive to kill the decedent, standing alone,
motive evidence was insufficient to support a SODDI defense.51
Given Alexander, most lower courts have devised some variation of
the “direct”52 or “clear”53 link or connection54 test. These courts reject
“conjectural”55 and “speculative”56 showings of the third party’s guilt.
41. See generally Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 350 (1891).
42. Id. at 351.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 356.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 356–57.
52. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Hobbs, 664 F.3d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 2011).
53. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sirmons, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138–39 (W.D. Okla. 2008);
Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996). But see People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164
(N.Y. 2001) (overturning the “clear link” test that New York had previously followed).
54. See, e.g., Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993); Bourgon B. Reynolds,
Constitutional Law—It Wasn’t Me! Zinger v. State and Arkansas’s Unconstitutional Approach to
Third-Party Exculpatory Evidence. Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993), 34 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 191, 191 (2011).
55. Burmingham v. State, 27 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Ark. 2000).
56. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Johnson, 904
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The accused’s evidence should “point[] unerringly”57 to the conclusion
that the third party committed the charged offense.58 More specifically,
in these jurisdictions, it is not enough to show that the third party had
either a motive or an opportunity to commit the charged crime.59
Rather, there must be substantial evidence60 directly connecting the
third party to the actual commission61 or perpetration62 of the charged
crime. For example, evidence of the third party’s suspicious post-crime
conduct, such as flight from the locale, is inadmissible.63
It is true that many commentators have criticized the majority view.64
F. Supp. 1303, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 1995); People v. Lewis, 28 P.3d 34 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1019 (2002); People v. Brown, No. 11CA0556, 2014 WL 6486126, at *3 (Colo. App. Nov.
20, 2014) (noting that the police did not investigate a “suspicious” vehicle that had been seen in
the victim’s neighborhood two days before the murder; the defense investigation established only
that the vehicle belonged to the Jefferson Hills Corporation, a residential juvenile mental health
facility; the court remarked that “any possible connection between the Jefferson Hills Corporation
and the victim was merely speculative”).
57. State v. Vanderhall, 226 S.E.2d 402, 404 (N.C. 1976).
58. State v. Easley, 662 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1983); State v. Wynn, 666 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); Vanderhall, 226 S.E.2d at 402.
59. Rogers v. Wong, 637 F. Supp. 2d 807, 824–25 (E.D. Cal. 2009); People v. Hartsch, 232
P.3d 663, 686–87 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 985 (2010); People v. DePriest, 163 P.3d
896, 932–33 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1190 (2008); People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015,
1061 (Cal. 2007); People v. Avila, 133 P.3d 1076 (Cal. 2006), modified (Aug. 2, 2006); People v.
Harris, 118 P.3d 545, 564–67 (Cal. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1065 (2006); People v. Yeoman,
72 P.3d 1166, 1202–05 (Cal. 2003); People v. Von Villas, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62, 100–01 (Cal Ct.
App. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 975 (1993); People v. Jackson, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778, 782 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991); People v. Johnson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 767, 773–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
60. Cikora v. Wainwright, 661 F. Supp. 813, 824 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff’d, 840 F.2d 893 (11th
Cir. 1988).
61. Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1997); Warner v. Workman, 814 F.
Supp. 2d 1188, 1225–28 (W.D. Okla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Warner v. Trammel, 520 F. App’x
675 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014) (mem.); Cikora v. Wainwright, 661 F.
Supp. 813, 824 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff’d, 840 F.2d 893 (11th Cir. 1988); People v. Brady, 236 P.3d
312, 323–25 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2874 (2011).
62. DePriest, 163 P.3d at 927–29 (Cal. 2007); Yeoman, 72 P.3d at 1202–05; People v.
Bradford, 939 P.2d 259, 312–13 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118 (1998); People v.
Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1, 21–22 (Cal. 1989); People v. Samaniego, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 895–97
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009), modified (Apr. 16, 2009).
63. United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 413 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Tietjen v.
United States, 534 U.S. 935 (2001); United States v. Gomez, 165 F.3d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1999);
see also McCord, supra note 4.
64. DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE OF OTHER MISCONDUCT AND
SIMILAR EVENTS § 3.2.1 (2009); Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production on
the Defendant Before Admitting Evidence that Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It
Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 272, 299 (1997); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 342–45, 355–
65; David A. Garcia, Third Party Culpability Evidence: A Criticism of the California MendezArline Exclusionary Rule—Towards a Constitutional Standard of Relevance and Admissibility, 17
U.S.F. L. REV. 441 (1982); Joy & McMunigal, supra note5, at 34; McCord, supra note 4; Powell,
supra note 4, at 1031–34; Reynolds, supra note 54, at 191; El-Sawaf, supra note 40, at 1051–52,
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The basic thrust of the criticism is that because the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is so high, and it is consequently relatively
easy to create reasonable doubt, it is unsound to have fixed rules as to
which types or sets of defense evidence should trigger the right to
inform the jury of facts pointing to a third party’s guilt.65 On occasion,
courts have approvingly cited these criticisms and at least purported to
relax the standard for admitting defense evidence of third-party
culpability.66 On one such occasion, the California Supreme Court
wrote that “[t]o be admissible, the third party evidence . . . need only be
capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.”67 The court
emphasized that the defense certainly does not need to present sufficient
evidence to establish “a probability” of the third party’s guilt.68
However, the court cautioned that “we do not require that any evidence,
however remote, must be admitted to show a third party’s possible
culpability.”69 Then, after seemingly relaxing the standard for evidence
of third-party culpability, the court added that “evidence of mere motive
or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more,
will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt;
there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person
to the actual perpetration of the crime.”70 On its face, the court’s
language was strikingly similar to the traditional test employed in
“direct link” jurisdictions.71
2. Evidence of the Third Party’s Commission of Crimes Similar to the
Charged Crime
In addition to proffering evidence connecting the third party to the
charged crime, defense counsel sometimes attempt to introduce

1055–60; Robert Hayes, Note, Enough Is Enough: The Law Court’s Decision to Functionally
Raise the “Reasonable Connection” Relevancy Connection in State v. Mitchell, 63 ME. L. REV.
531, 532–34, 548–49 (2010); Colleen Rutherford Maas, Note, And Justice for Hall: The
Overruling of the Mendez-Arline Standard of Admissibility for Third Party Culpability Evidence
in People v. Hall, 14 W. ST. U. L. REV. 261 (1986).
65. As Judge Garcia noted in his article on the subject, the meaningful constitutional question
is whether the accused had presented sufficient evidence to generate a reasonable doubt about his
or her guilt. Garcia, supra note 64, at 444. There are so many conceivable states of the record
that, as a matter of logic, could give rise to reasonable doubt that it is illiberal to prescribe hardand-fast rules as to when the accused’s evidence is adequate to create a reasonable doubt.
66. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1986) (citing Garcia, supra note 64).
67. Id. at 104.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Compare id., with People v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 1941), and Holmes v.
South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
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evidence that the third party has committed other crimes similar to the
charged crime. When the defense endeavors to do so, the defense is
often met by a character evidence objection by the prosecution.
Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 405 set out the character evidence
doctrine.72 In pertinent part, the restyled Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) states:
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses . . . . This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.73

Rule 404(b)(1) states the character evidence prohibition.74 By virtue
of the prohibition, the proponent may not introduce evidence of a
person’s other misconduct to infer the person’s disposition or propensity
to misconduct and then utilize that inference to support the conclusion
that on the occasion in question the person acted “in character,” that is,
consistently with the disposition or propensity. The rationale for the
prohibition rests on the concurrence of two probative dangers.75 One is
the danger of misdecision, namely, the risk that at least at a
subconscious level, the introduction of the evidence will tempt the jury
to decide the case on an improper basis.76 The first inferential step in
character reasoning (the step from the act to an inference of disposition
or propensity) forces the trier to focus on the person’s subjective
character. Especially when the person in question is the accused, the
jury’s exposure to testimony about his or her other misdeeds might
prompt the jury to convict to protect society from the accused, not
because they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty of the charged crime. The second danger is the risk of
overvaluation.77 Psychological studies generally support the conclusion
that laypersons overestimate the probative value of a person’s character
in predicting the person’s conduct.78
However, Rule 404(b)(2) indicates that the proponent may defeat a
character evidence objection by identifying a non-character theory of

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

FED. R. EVID. 404, 405.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:19 (rev. 2013).
Id. § 2:19, at 2-141-43.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
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logical relevance.79 As the text of the rule states, it is permissible for
the proponent to introduce the evidence for such alternative purposes as
proving “motive, opportunity, intent,” and the like.80 When one of
these theories is tenable on the facts of the case, reliance on the theory
tends to moot one or both of the probative dangers inspiring the
prohibition.81 Suppose, for example, that the accused is charged with
violating the Extortionate Credit Transaction Act.82 To convict an
accused under the Act, the prosecution must prove that the alleged
victim acted out of fear.83 The prosecutor might offer evidence that
prior to the transaction, the accused made several threats to the alleged
victim. The threats are relevant to show the alleged victim’s fear. Since
the prosecutor is not employing the evidence to predict the accused’s
conduct, the second probative danger is absent. Consequently, the
judge may legitimately admit the evidence with a limiting instruction
under Federal Rule of Evidence 105.84
By its terms, Rule 404(b)(1) is not limited to conduct of a criminal
accused. The rule refers generally to any “person.”85 Thus, the
prohibition comes into play even when the defense proffers evidence of
the misdeeds of a third party that the defense claims committed the
charged offense. In many cases, the defense tries to introduce evidence
that the third party perpetrated an offense or offenses similar to the
charged crime—so-called “reverse 404(b)” evidence.86 The rub is that
most courts apply the character evidence prohibition as rigorously to
such testimony as they do when the prosecution offers evidence of an
accused’s uncharged misconduct.87 They see no basis in the text of the
79. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 75, §§ 2:20 to 2:22.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 2:22.
83. Id.
84. FED. R. EVID. 105. The instruction should have two prongs. One prong specifies the
permissible use of the evidence. The second forbids the jury from using the evidence as a basis
for simplistic character reasoning, “he did it once before, therefore he did it again.” 2
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 75, §§ 9:72 to 9:74.
85. Mason v. Mitchell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 744, 779 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (“all persons”), aff’d in
part, remanded in part, 320 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 779
A.2d 1195, 1204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), appeal denied, 790 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 2001) (noting that in
dissent, Judge Michael Joyce pointed out that the statute generally refers to “a person”).
86. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 75, §§ 2:20 to 2:22.
87. United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976, 991−92 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
803 (2013); United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 1744 (2013); United States v. Ushery, 400 F. App’x 674, 676−77 (3d Cir. 2010); Mason v.
Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 634 (6th Cir. 2003); People v. Homick, 289 P.3d 791 (Cal. 2012), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 114 (2013); see also State v. Savino, 567 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1990) (holding that
the trial judge should not apply a more relaxed standard of similarity merely because the evidence
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rule for treating the misconduct of the accused and that of a third party
differently. By way of example, suppose that the defense presents
evidence that the third party’s other offenses and the charged crime
display the same, one-of-a-kind modus operandi88 or that the third party
concocted a plan including the charged crime as well as the third party’s
other offenses.89 In either event, the defense may introduce the
evidence because it is logically relevant on a tenable non-character
theory. However, when the defense cannot do so, Rule 404(b)(1)
represents an insuperable obstacle to introducing the testimony about
the third party’s other offenses.
Predictably, defense counsel have challenged the constitutionality of
these restrictive rules. However, in the vast majority of cases, courts
have rebuffed these challenges.90 Again, as previously stated, in
Holmes v. South Carolina,91 the Supreme Court forewent an
opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the “direct link”
standard.92 The upshot is that the majority view is still firmly
entrenched in most jurisdictions.93
B. The Minority View
Although most jurisdictions adhere to some variation of the “direct
link” test, as we shall soon see there are dissenters. The courts
subscribing to the minority view set the threshold lower when the
defense offers evidence of the third party’s involvement in the charged
crime and relax the standards when the defense attempts to introduce

is offered by the defense rather than the prosecution).
88. Bohanan v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 902, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 19 F.3d 8 (2d
Cir. 1994); People v. Abilez, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526 (2007), cert. denied sub nom. Abilez v.
California, 552 U.S. 1067 (2007); McCord, supra note 4.
89. United States v. Kollie, 501 F.App’x 206 (3d Cir. 2012); Abilez, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526.
90. See, e.g., Wynne v. Renico, 606 F.3d 867, 870−71 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing two lower
court decisions sustaining the constitutional challenge), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2873 (2011);
Miller v. Brunsman, 599 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2010); Narrod v. Napoli, 763 F. Supp. 2d 359,
377−78 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); Kowalak v. Scott, 712 F. Supp. 2d 657, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2010);
Rogers v. Wong, 637 F. Supp. 2d 807, 824−26 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Mastin v. Senkowski, 297 F.
Supp. 2d 558 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); People v. Mincey, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822 (1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1014 (1992). But see United States v. Montelongo, 420 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Blum, 62 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1995); Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.
1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 917 F.2d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated in part on
reh’g, 935 F.2d 194 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Leon v. United States, 502 U.S. 1047
(1992); United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 777 (11th Cir. 1989).
91. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Case v. Hatch, 708 F.3d 1152, 1177 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing New Mexico
law); Armstrong v. Hobbs, 698 F.2d 1063 1067–68 (8th Cir. 2012); Krider v. Conover, 497 F.
App’x 818 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1469 (2013).
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evidence of the third party’s commission of uncharged offenses similar
to the charged crime.
To begin with, these courts believe that rather than adopting a
“specialized” relevance standard for evidence of a third party’s
perpetration of the charged offense, the courts ought to simply apply the
normal relevance tests.94 As previously stated, under the “direct link”
standard, most courts have barred evidence of the flight of a third party
after the perpetration of the charged crime.95 In contrast, applying its
normal relevance standard, a Pennsylvania court ruled that the accused
had a right to submit such evidence to the jury.96
Moreover, these courts ease the application of Rule 404(b) when the
defense tenders evidence that a third party has committed other offenses
similar to the charged crime. In Arizona97 and Pennsylvania,98 courts
have formally held that the character evidence prohibition is
inapplicable when the defense offers third-party culpability evidence.
In a Maine case,99 as Judge Skolnik astutely observed in dissent, the
majority of the state supreme court justices in effect disregarded the
prohibition.100 The accused father was charged with child abuse.101 To
show that the mother was the real abuser, the accused proffered
evidence that the mother had been abused as a child, as well as expert
testimony that persons abused as children tend to become adult
abusers.102 The dissent correctly noted that there was no obvious noncharacter theory justifying the admission of the evidence.103
Of course, even when an item of evidence is otherwise admissible
under Rule 404(b), the evidence is still subject to discretionary

94. Jordan v. United States, 722 A.2d 1257 (D.C. 1998) (applying the normal standard of
relevance); State v. Meister, 220 P.3d 1055 (Idaho 2009); People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y.
2001); Reynolds, supra note 54, 217.
95. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
96. Commonwealth v. Milligan, 693 A.2d 1313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
97. State v. Machado, 246 P.3d 632 (Ariz. 2011).
98. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 779 A.2d 1195 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), appeal denied, 790
A.2d 1016 (Pa. 2001); see also Allen v. State, 103 A.3d 700, 712 (Md. 2014) (“In Sessoms v.
State, 357 Md. 274, 744 A.2d 9 (2000), this Court held that the exclusion under Md. Rule 5404(b) applies only to other crimes or prior bad acts of the defendant. In other words, the
exclusion of other crimes evidence does not apply when the accused, in his or her defense, offers
other crimes evidence of another individual.” (emphasis omitted)).
99. State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984) (Scolnik, J., dissenting); 2 IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 75, §§ 10:44, 10:120.
100. Conlogue, 474 A.2d at 173−76 (Scolnik, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 169 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 171−73.
103. Id. at 173−76 (Scolnik, J., dissenting).
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exclusion under Rule 403.104 That rule authorizes a trial judge to
balance the probative value against the probative danger and to exclude
logically relevant evidence when the attendant probative dangers
substantially outweigh the probative worth of the evidence.105 The
courts championing the minority view take the position that trial judges
should apply Rule 403 more sparingly to defense evidence of thirdparty culpability.106 The courts reason that such evidence presents less
risk of a verdict on an improper basis than evidence of the accused’s
own uncharged misconduct.107 Unlike the third party, the accused is on
trial. The accused not only has a greater stake in an accurate verdict
than the third party, evidence of the accused’s bad character
also presents a risk that the jury will commit an inferential error leading
more directly to an inaccurate verdict.
In short, there are marked differences between the majority and
minority jurisdictions with respect to the treatment of both evidence of a
third party’s involvement in the charged crime and testimony about a
third party’s commission of other offenses similar to the charged crime.
However, as we shall see in Part II, although the courts disagree in those
respects, they concur in other respects—respects that reflect the
fundamental differences between the traditional SODDI defense and the
SODDI defense 2.0 focused on the failure of the police to diligently
investigate leads pointing to the guilt of a third party.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE SODDI DEFENSE 2.0
When an accused urges a conventional SODDI defense, he or she
presents evidence to show that a third party committed the crime with

104. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b), with FED. R. EVID. 403.
105. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”).
106. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 608 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Seals,
419 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1047 (2005); United States v. Stevens,
935 F.2d 1380, 1402 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 777 (11th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Ivins, No.
09-320, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63894, at *2, (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2010); People v. Cruz, 643
N.E.2d 636 (Ill. 1994); State v. Garfole, 388 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1978), appeal after remand, 403
A.2d 888 (N.J. 1979); State v. Schneidell, 584 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d, 595
N.W.2d 661 (Wis. 1999); Joan L. Larsen, Comment, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain
Meaning: The Accused’s Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule
404(b), 87 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (1993) (applying a relaxed standard).
107. Cohen, 888 F.2d at 777 (“When the defendant offers similar acts evidence of a witness to
prove a fact pertinent to the defense, the normal risk of prejudice is absent.”); Ivins, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63894, at *2.
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which the accused is charged.108 The SODDI defense 2.0 is a variation
on that theme; here the accused presents evidence to show that the
police failed to diligently investigate the guilt of a third party who
plausibly committed the charged crime.109 Although in the past,
defense counsel, such as the late Johnny Cochran, have undeniably
resorted to the 2.0 version of the defense, several questions remain.
Have the courts formally recognized the defense? And, if so, what are
the consequences—in particular, the evidentiary consequences—of the
differences between the two versions of the defense?
A. The Judicial Recognition of the SODDI Defense 2.0
The year 2014 witnessed two significant decisions, one federal and
one state, formally recognizing the defense. Indeed, the cases not only
recognized the defense; they also gave the defense constitutional status
and found constitutional error when a trial judge significantly curtailed
the defense’s efforts to develop the defense at trial.
1. Alvarez v. Ercole
Julio Alvarez faced New York state criminal charges for shooting and
killing Daniel Colon.110 After his state court conviction, he filed a
federal habeas corpus petition.111 At the very beginning of the Second
Circuit’s opinion granting Alvarez relief, Judge Guido Calabresi briefly
summed up the case:
Alvarez’ defense strategy was to show that the New York City Police
Department investigation had been incomplete in ways that created
reasonable doubt that the government had proved its case against him.
In support of this argument, Alvarez sought to cross-examine the lead
detective to show that the police had not investigated leads provided
by a witness, Edwin Vasquez, whose tips were memorialized in a
detective’s notes and an investigative DD5 report. The trial court
prohibited Alvarez from pursuing this line of questioning . . . .112

The victim, Daniel Colon, was a local drug dealer.113 Colon had
been meeting with two crack dealers, Manny Colon and Aramis
Fournier, when a car pulled up near the three men.114 According to

108. See supra Part I (describing the traditional SODDI defense).
109. Compare supra Part I (describing the traditional SODDI defense), with supra Part II
(addressing the SODDI defense 2.0).
110. Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014).
111. Id. at 229.
112. Id. at 225.
113. Id. at 226.
114. Id.
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Manny and Fournier, the car was gold or silver.115 An occupant jumped
out of the car and shot Daniel Colon.116 From her apartment, Margie
Rodriguez heard the gunshots.117 When she looked down, she saw two
men drive off in a gray car.118 On the day of the shooting neither
Rodriguez nor Colon nor Fournier could identify the shooter or
driver.119
The next day Manny told the police that he remembered that the
shooter’s name was Julio.120 On the same day a Detective Monaco
questioned Edwin Vasquez, who claimed to know about the murder.121
The detective recorded the information in informal notes and later
transferred the information to a DD5 investigative report, the form that
the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) uses to document followup investigation after a complaint.122 According to the report, Vasquez
told Monaco that on either the night of the shooting or the next
morning, Vasquez’s acquaintance, Julio, told Vasquez that he “took
care of” his problem with a man who had argued with Julio’s wife.123
Julio told Vasquez that the man had insulted both Julio and his wife—a
slight “that Julio would not ‘let . . . lie.’”124 The DD5 reflected that
Vasquez gave the detective a phone number for Julio and directions to
find Julio’s home.125
The police never called the phone number provided by Vasquez.126
Nor did police attempt to locate the home Vasquez had mentioned.
However, using this information, the defense was able to identify a Julio
Guerrero who lived near the shooting side, was married, and drove a
silver car.127
Before trial, Detective Monaco retired.128 At trial the prosecutor
called Detective Alfred.129 When the defense counsel began to question
Alfred about the investigative leads in Monaco’s DD5 report, the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226–27.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id.
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prosecution objected on hearsay grounds.130 The trial judge sustained
the objection.131 The judge forbade the defense counsel from
questioning Alfred about the DD5.132 In addition, the trial judge ruled
that the proposed line of inquiry “was barred by a state evidentiary rule
requiring a ‘clear link’ between evidence implicating a culpable third
party and the defendant’s charged crime.”133 The jury convicted
Alvarez of manslaughter and assault.134 Both the New York Appellate
Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.135
Alvarez then sought federal habeas corpus relief.136 The district
court granted relief, but the government appealed.137 Writing for the
Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi stated that “[w]e agree with the District
Court that the [state] trial court’s decision to prohibit Alvarez from
questioning Detective Alfred about the Vasquez DD5 was” not “a
‘reasonable limit[] on . . . cross-examination . . . .’”138
Judge Calabresi reasoned that the state trial judge’s hearsay ruling
was incorrect and that that ruling had led to the violation of Alvarez’s
right to cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment.139 The judge
acknowledged that the references to Vasquez’s assertions would have
constituted hearsay if the defense had relied on a traditional SODDI
defense.140 The judge stated that the hearsay ruling would have been
sound if “Alvarez [had] offered the report as a means of establishing the
truth of its content (i.e., that the ‘problem’ that Vasquez’s friend ‘Julio’
‘had t[aken] care of’ was the murdered Dan Colon . . . ).”141 However,
in Judge Calabresi’s view, the defense had made it clear to the trial
judge that that was not the object of Alvarez’s cross-examination.142
Alvarez sought to demonstrate that the NYPD had failed to take even
obvious, preliminary steps to investigate the leads that were generated
by Vasquez’s interview—summarized in the Vasquez DD5.143
Alvarez’s strategy, which defense counsel heralded during opening and

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228−29.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230−31.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id.
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emphasized in closing, was to show that the NYPD’s incomplete
investigation indicated that the NYPD had prematurely concluded that
Alvarez was the guilty party, and that that raised a reasonable doubt that
Alvarez was in fact responsible.144
Judge Calabresi’s hearsay analysis was sound. Even an assertive
statement constitutes hearsay only if, at trial, it is offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.145 There are numerous
legitimate non-hearsay theories. One is the so-called “mental input”
theory: The statement is offered not for its truth but rather to show its
effect on the state of mind of the hearer or reader.146 Thus, a statement
is admissible as non-hearsay if it is logically relevant to show that the
hearer or reader received notice or learned of a particular fact.147 The
prosecution routinely invokes this theory when it asks the investigating
officer to explain why he or she responded to the crime scene; the
answer, of course, is a report that they received from the police
dispatcher that a crime is in progress or has recently been committed.148
By the same token, in Alvarez the defense counsel was attempting to
show that Vasquez had provided investigative leads to the police—tips
that they neglected to pursue.149 The trial judge should have permitted
the defense counsel to question Detective Alfred about the contents of
the DD5 but, on request by the government, read the jury a limiting
instruction about the evidentiary status of Vasquez’s statements to
Monaco.150
However, Judge Calabresi’s conclusion about the judge’s erroneous
hearsay ruling could not end the court’s analysis.151 In the procedural
setting of the case, a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the Second
Circuit had to reach the further question of whether the trial judge’s
mistake amounted to a constitutional error; otherwise, a federal court
cannot grant relief to a state prisoner.152 The court easily concluded that
the error was of a constitutional dimension.153 The judge’s erroneous
hearsay ruling “precluded Alvarez from fleshing out his main defense
theory: that the police investigation into the murder was flawed and had
144. Id.
145. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
146. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1004, at 1017-24 (5th ed. 2011), LEXIS.
147. Id.
148. Id. § 1004, at 10-19-24.
149. Id.
150. FED. R. EVID. 105.
151. Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 2014).
152. Id. at 230–31.
153. Id. at 231.
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improperly disregarded a promising alternate suspect.”154 The essential
thrust of the defense was “‘a serious lack of thoroughness in the police
investigation.”155 The trial judge’s error not only ran afoul of Supreme
Court decisions such as Delaware v. Van Arsdall,156 which protects the
right to cross-examine under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation
clause.157 The judge’s ruling was also at odds with the Court’s
landmark 1973 decision, Chambers v. Mississippi,158 safeguarding the
accused’s implied Sixth Amendment right to present critical
exculpatory evidence.159
2. State v. McCullar
While the Second Circuit handed down its decision in Alvarez in
August of 2014, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its decision in
McCullar in September.160 As Part I of this Article noted, an accused
can develop a SODDI defense in one of two ways: either proffering
evidence of the third party’s direct involvement in the charged offense
or attempting to introduce evidence of the third party’s commission of
uncharged offenses similar to the charged crime.161 In Alvarez, the
accused relied primarily on the first method.162 The defense pointed to
the location of Julio Guerrero’s home, his marital status, his ownership
of a silver car, and his alleged statements to Vasquez—facts that made
him “a promising alternate suspect” and should have prompted the
police to investigate his possible guilt more thoroughly.163 In contrast,
McCullar also utilized the second method, that is, marshaling evidence
of the third party’s guilt of offenses that paralleled the charged crime. 164
Like Alvarez, McCullar was charged with murder.165
The
prosecution alleged that McCullar had slashed the throat of Filiberto
Bedolla.166 Like Alvarez, McCullar attempted to establish reasonable
doubt by “demonstrat[ing] shortcomings in [the] police
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 232.
Id.
475 U.S. 673, 679–80 (1986).
See generally id.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299–302 (1973).
Alvarez, 763 F.3d at 232. See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M.
GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE
FAVORABLE EVIDENCE chs. 1–2 (3d ed. 2004).
160. See State v. McCullar, 335 P.3d 900 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
161. See supra Part I.
162. See supra text accompanying note 110.
163. Alvarez, 763 F.3d at 232.
164. McCullar, 335 P.3d at 903-04.
165. Id. at 904.
166. Id. at 903.
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investigation.”167 More specifically, McCullar claimed that the police
had not properly pursued leads pointing to the guilt of Dawna Finch,
Bedolla’s girlfriend.168
To substantiate his claim, McCullar employed both methods of the
SODDI defense, suggesting Finch’s guilt. Initially, like Alvarez,
McCullar submitted evidence of Finch’s involvement in the charged
crime.169 Bedolla had been found dead in his bed, and prior to the
killing, there had been a picture of Finch on the headboard of the bed.170
The picture was gone when Bedolla’s body was discovered.171 There
was also evidence that Finch had threatened Bedolla “just before he was
killed.”172 When the body was discovered, $3000 of Bedolla’s money
was missing,173 and Finch suddenly had “a wad” of money the day after
the killing.174
But McCullar also wanted to present evidence of Finch’s character
trait for violence. Two witnesses
told police that they had witnessed a violent outburst by Dawna Finch
six to eight months before Bedolla was killed. In that attack, they
reported, Finch pinned a man to a bed and held a pair of scissors to his
throat in a dispute over drug money. Dawna was on a tangent and
wanted money for drugs. The men told Dawna that they didn’t have
any money and she got mad. Dawna tackled [one man] onto a bed and
was choking him with one hand. In the other hand Dawna was
holding a pair of scissors. Dawna threatened to kill [the man] unless
they gave her money.175

The appellate court characterized this incident as “an attack remarkably
similar to the attack on Bedolla.”176
The McCullar trial played out in much the same way as the Alvarez
trial. From the outset, McCullar made it clear that his primary argument
was that the “police failed to adequately investigate” Finch.177 Their
investigation of Finch had been inadequate.178 McCullar contended that

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 907.
Id. at 903–04.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 908.
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the information provided the police constituted “credible tips.”179
Those tips made Finch’s guilt sufficiently “plausible” that the police
should have followed up on the tips more diligently.180 The court
concluded that rather than relying on a conventional SODDI defense,
“McCullar’s efforts to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt hinged on his
failure-to-investigate theory.”181
At trial, McCullar’s defense counsel endeavored to develop the
theory in much the same way as Alvarez’s had done. McCullar’s
counsel attempted to elicit testimony about the contents of the oral
reports, pointing to Finch, that the police had received.182 Like the
government in Alvarez, the prosecutor in McCullar objected on hearsay
grounds, and as in Alvarez, the trial judge sustained the objection.183
The prosecution objected to any evidence of Finch’s other violent acts
under the state version of Federal Rule 403 on the ground that the
evidence was unduly prejudicial.184 The trial judge accepted the
prosecution argument and barred the evidence on that ground as well.185
The appellate court found fault with both evidentiary rulings.186 The
court’s extended analysis of the hearsay rulings mirrored the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Alvarez. The court ruled that testimony about the
reports was admissible as non-hearsay.187 McCullar’s attorney had
made it quite clear on the record that the defense was not offering the
reports for their truth, that is, “to prove that Dawna did it.”188 In other
words, the defense attorney articulated the 2.0 version of the SODDI
defense.
The court observed that given McCullar’s failure-toinvestigate theory, the reports were relevant “‘because of [their] impact
on the hearer,’” specifically, the police investigators.189 The reports put
the police on notice of “credible tips” which were then the investigators’
duty to pursue.190
The court’s analysis of the admissibility of the testimony about
Finch’s violent acts was relatively brief. On the facts, there was a
strong argument that the testimony about Finch’s violent conduct
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 907.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 908; see also id. at 906 (describing “McCullar’s failure-to-investigate theory”).
Id. at 905–08.
Id.
Id. at 908–09.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 905–06.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 905–06 n.4.
Id. at 906–07.
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amounted to nothing more than propensity evidence inadmissible under
Rule 404(b). On the facts, it is difficult to discern a non-character
theory of logical relevance for the evidence of her attack on the other
man. It is true that in both incidents, Bedolla’s killing and the attack on
the other man, the victim was on a bed and some cutting implement had
been used.191 However, it is a stretch to contend that those facts make
out a distinctive modus operandi192 or establish the existence of a
common scheme or plan including Bedolla’s killing as well as the other
incident.193
Yet, given the lack of a character objection premised on Rule 404, the
appellate court discussed only the Rule 403 issue.194 Under Rule 403,
the trial judge balances the probative value of the item of evidence
against any incidental dangers. On the plus side of the weighing
process, the court characterized the probative value of the testimony as
substantial because the other attack was “remarkably similar to the
attack on Bedolla.”195 On the negative side of the calculus, the court
attempted to distinguish the testimony from evidence of “gruesome
photographs of a homicide victim’s corpse” and “evidence of a rape
victim’s sexual promiscuity” that the court deemed more prejudicial.196
The court added that like Federal Rule 403, the state version of the rule
is biased in favor of admitting relevant evidence.197 When striking the
balance is a close call in the judge’s mind, the rule mandates that the
judge admit the evidence.
In Alvarez, after critiquing the trial judge’s hearsay and crossexamination rulings, the procedural setting forced the Second Circuit to
reach the constitutional issue.198 Alvarez was a federal habeas corpus
proceeding, and the court could not grant relief unless it found a
constitutional error.199 In contrast, McCullar was a direct appeal in
state court.200 Nevertheless, the Utah court proceeded to address the
question of whether the trial judge’s hearsay and character rulings rose
to the level of constitutional error.201 The court explained that the
resolution of that question affected the standard determining whether
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 906.
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 75, §§ 3:12 to 3:13.
Id. §§ 3:21 to 3:23.
See McCullar, 335 P.3d at 909.
Id. at 908–10.
Id. at 909 n.8.
Id. at 909.
Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223, 232–34 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 229.
See McCullar, 335 P.3d at 901.
Id.
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the court would reverse.202
When the court turned to the constitutional question, as in Alvarez the
court concluded that the trial judge had violated the accused’s right to
present a defense.203 The court noted some of the same Supreme Court
precedents that Alvarez had relied on.204 The Utah court specifically
cited Washington v. Texas205 and Chambers,206 the seminal Supreme
Court decisions enunciating the existence of the accused’s Sixth
Amendment right to present vital exculpatory testimony.207 Due to the
trial judge’s erroneous rulings, by closing argument the defense was
relegated to “vague references to a third party’s possible guilt or an
incomplete police investigation.”208 McCullar had been denied a
“meaningful opportunity to present” his defense based on the failure-toinvestigate theory.209
B. The Evidentiary Differences Between the Original SODDI Defense
and the SODDI Defense 2.0
At this point, it should be evident that there are important differences
between the evidentiary implications of the two theories.
1. Hearsay
Both Alvarez and McCullar highlighted the differing hearsay
analyses under the two theories. When a defense counsel relies on the
traditional SODDI theory, he or she is contending that the third party
actually committed the charged offense. When the defense proffers the
testimony about the third party’s acts, the relevance of the testimony is
conditioned on a showing of the third party’s identity as the actor.
Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a)–(b) govern the proof of such
foundational or preliminary facts. In pertinent part, they read:
(a) In General. The court must decide any preliminary question about
whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is
admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules,
except those on privilege.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 910–12.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 911.
Id. (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
See IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 159, at chs. 1–2.
McCullar, 335 P.3d at 912.
Id.
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(b) Relevance That Depends on a Fact. When the relevance of
evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.210

When the relevance of an act depends on the identity of the actor, as
it does here, Rule 104(b) governs.211 While under 104(a) the technical
exclusionary rules such as hearsay do not apply to foundational
testimony, the rules apply with full force when 104(b) controls. The
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 104 explicates the rationale for the
difference between the two provisions.212 The conventional wisdom is
that the common-law courts evolved exclusionary rules such as hearsay
because they doubted the competence of lay jurors to critically assess
the weight of such testimony. However, under Rule 104(a) the decision
maker is a judge.213 If the exclusionary doctrines are “jury-protecting”
rules but there is no jury in sight, it makes no sense to apply the rules.
However, ultimately the jury makes the decision under Rule 104(b). If,
for example, the judge finds that there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding that a lay witness has personal knowledge of a fact,214 the judge
admits the testimony, and the jury makes the final decision whether to
believe that the person actually witnessed the fact or event. If the jury
must do so, it is justifiable to apply the jury-protecting rules such as
hearsay to the foundational testimony.
When the defense counsel is presenting a traditional SODDI defense,
he or she is contending that the third party actually committed the
charged offense. On that assumption, any statements tending to show
the third party’s guilt are being offered for their truth. The statements
are not only assertive under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a),215 they
210. FED. R. EVID. 104.
211. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Determining Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104, in 45 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 24 (1992); see
also CAL. EVID. CODE § 403(a)(4) (“The proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of
producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evidence is
inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
existence of the preliminary fact, when . . . [t]he proffered evidence is of . . . conduct of a
particular person and the preliminary fact is whether the person . . . so conducted himself.”). The
Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule 104(b) states that the federal drafters used § 403 as
their model.
212. FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee’s note.
213. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
214. Federal Rule of Evidence 602 governs the sufficiency of the proof of a lay witness’s
personal or firsthand knowledge. Rule 602 incorporates the 104(b) standard: “A witness may
testify to a matter if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the
witness’s own testimony.” FED. R. EVID. 602. The 104(b) standard also controls the sufficiency
of authentication evidence. Like Rule 602, Rule 901(a) incorporates the 104(b) standard.
215. FED. R. EVID. 801.
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are also being put to a hearsay use under Rule 801(c).216 If so, the
statements constitute hearsay, and they cannot be admitted as
substantive evidence to support a traditional SODDI defense unless the
proponent demonstrates that they fall within a hearsay exemption in
Rule 801 or an exception stated in Rules 803, 804, or 807.217
However, the hearsay analysis is radically different when the defense
counsel presents a SODDI defense 2.0. The defense is no longer
offering the statements to the police in order to prove the truth of the
assertions in the statements. Rather, the defense is merely trying to
prove that the statements were made to the police. The statements
constitute the investigative tips that the police received. It is the failure
of the police to pursue the tips that creates the reasonable doubt under
the SODDI defense 2.0. As both Alvarez and McCullar correctly
concluded, under a SODDI defense 2.0 the statements are “mental
input” that are relevant to show their effect on the state of mind of the
hearer.218 The statements qualify as non-hearsay under Rule 801(c).219
The judge should admit the statement over a hearsay objection but, on
the prosecutor’s request, administer a limiting instruction to the jury
under Rule 105.220
2. Character
Just as the hearsay analysis under the traditional SODDI theory
differs profoundly from the analysis under the SODDI defense 2.0, the
character evidence analysis under the traditional theory is
fundamentally distinct from the analysis under the SODDI defense 2.0.
Assume that the defense has elected to rely on a traditional defense.
In addition, suppose that as in McCullar,221 the defense has decided to
attempt to substantiate the defense by showing that the third party has
committed other offenses similar to the charged crime. Unless there are
additional facts triggering a legitimate non-character theory of logical
relevance such as proof that the charged and uncharged crimes share a
distinctive, one-of-a-kind modus operandi,222 the testimony amounts to
character evidence pure and simple. The defense is arguing, at least
implicitly, that the testimony shows that the third party has a disposition

216. Id.
217. FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804, 807.
218. See generally Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2014); State v. McCullar, 335
P.3d 900 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
219. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
220. FED. R. EVID. 105.
221. See generally McCullar, 335 P.3d 900.
222. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 75, §§ 3:12 to 3:14.
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or propensity for similar conduct and, in turn, that inference increases
the probability that on the charged occasion the third party acted “in
character”—and committed the crime that the accused is charged with.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) prohibits the proponent from
relying on that theory.223 Thus, Rule 404(b)(1) prevents the defense
from introducing the testimony about the third party’s uncharged
misconduct on that theory to support a traditional SODDI defense. The
defense is trying to do precisely what the rule forbids: the defense is
offering the evidence “to prove [the third party’s] character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the [third party] acted in accordance
with the character.”224
Alternatively, assume that the defense has selected a SODDI defense
2.0. When the defense relies on this version of the defense and offers
testimony about the investigators’ receipt of reports about similar,
uncharged crimes by the third party, there is no violation of Rule
404(b)(1). By its terms, Rule 404(b)(1) applies only when the
proponent offers testimony about a person’s uncharged misconduct to
support the ultimate inference “that on a particular occasion, the person
acted in accordance with the character.”225 The prohibition codified in
Rule 404(b)(1) does not come into play when the proponent offers the
testimony to support a different ultimate inference.226
Two hypotheticals in which the accused claims self-defense illustrate
the point. In both cases, the accused claims self-defense. In the first
variation, although the alleged victim had committed prior violent acts,
the accused did not learn of the acts until after the fatal encounter. In
that situation, if the accused attempted to offer the evidence, the accused
would have to rely on a chain of character reasoning: the alleged victim
acted violently before, that conduct shows his or her disposition toward
violent conduct, and ultimately that disposition increases the probability
that the alleged victim was the aggressor at the time of the encounter
with the accused.227 While some jurisdictions have carved out an
exception to the character evidence prohibition for such evidence in
self-defense cases, many jurisdictions apply the prohibition and bar the
evidence.228
Contrast the second hypothetical. With one exception, the facts are
identical to those in the first but in the second hypothetical the accused
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
FED. R. EVID. 404.
Id.
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 75, § 2:22.
IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 146, § 806.
Id.
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had heard about the victim’s violent acts before the encounter. In this
situation, courts uniformly allow the accused to introduce testimony
about the victim’s prior violence, not to prove the alleged victim’s
conduct but, rather, to show the accused’s state of mind.229 This rule is
sometimes referred to as the “communicated character” doctrine.230
The accused’s earlier receipt of information about the alleged victim’s
violent behavior tends to support the accused’s claim that he or she had
a subjectively honest,231 and objectively reasonable232 belief that they
were in danger and needed to resort to self-defensive force.
The second hypothetical is analogous to a situation in which, to
support a SODDI 2.0 defense, the accused offers testimony that the
police received reports about the third party’s misconduct similar to the
charged offense. In Fourth Amendment cases where the question is
whether the police possessed probable cause, the cases permit the
officers to testify that before the arrest or search, they had received
reports about the suspect’s prior, similar misconduct.233 The officer’s
receipt of the report helps enable the officer to form a belief (probable
cause) that justifies a certain investigatory step, that is, an arrest or
search. By the same token, after the officer receives a report about the
third party’s similar misconduct, the officer’s knowledge should prompt
the officer to diligently investigate the third party’s possible guilt of the
charged crime. Both here and in the second hypothetical, the ultimate
inference is state of mind rather than the conduct of the person who is
the subject of the report. In both situations, the trial judge may admit
testimony about the reports without violating the character evidence
229. See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 451 F.3d 930, 935–36 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of
specific instances of a victim’s prior violent conduct for purposes of proving a defendant’s state
of mind . . . is only admissible to the extent a defendant establishes knowledge of such prior
violent conduct at the time of the conduct underlying the offense charged.”), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2338 (2013); see also Smith v. Dretke, 417 F.3d 438, 441–42 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
the evidence is relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in a self-defense case if the
defendant had some knowledge of the alleged victim’s past violent behavior at the time of the
homicide); Socha v. Wilson, 477 F. Supp. 2d 809, 820 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“It has been well
established that specific instances of a deceased’s prior conduct, as well as the perpetrator’s
knowledge of the deceased’s reputation for violence, were admissible to establish subjective state
of mind.”); FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note (stating that the normal character
evidence restrictions are inapplicable when the incidents demonstrating the alleged victim’s
violent character were “known by the accused” before the encounter); Stephen Saltzburg, SelfDefense and the Rules of Evidence, 14 CRIM. JUST. 46, 48 (2000).
230. Ex parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
231. Socha v. Wilson, 477 F. Supp. 2d 809, 820 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
232. See generally Dretke, 417 F.3d 438.
233. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 146, § 1911 (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573 (1971); El-Amin v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 115 (Va. 2005); State v. Jones, 846 A.2d
569, 577 (N.J. 2004)); see also State v. Ruff, 967 P.2d 742 (Kan. 1998).
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prohibition in Rule 404(b)(1). Again, on the prosecutor’s request, the
judge should give the jury a limiting instruction under Rule 105.
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SODDI
DEFENSE 2.0
Part II noted the significant differences between the traditional
SODDI defense and the emerging, 2.0 version of the defense.234 In
many respects, the 2.0 version of the defense is understandably more
attractive to the accused: the 2.0 version seems to require less evidence
of the third party’s guilt, and the proffered evidence is less vulnerable to
hearsay and character objections by the prosecution.235 However,
precisely because the restrictions on the 2.0 version of the defense are
so seemingly lax, prosecutors may object that the defense is illegitimate
and that the courts should recognize only the traditional version of the
defense.
It is clear that trial judges sometimes permit defense counsel to rely
on the 2.0 version of the defense. As the introduction noted, the defense
did so in the O.J. Simpson prosecution in Los Angeles in 1995.236
There, the defense claimed that the police had overlooked evidence
pointing to a killer other than O.J. Simpson.237 Moreover, in cases in
which the prosecution relies heavily on scientific evidence to establish
the accused’s guilt, the defense often makes a parallel argument: “the
path not taken.”238 For instance, suppose that the accused is charged
with possession of a contraband drug. A government forensic chemist
testifies to the identity of the substance found in the accused’s
possession, but he or she concedes that they relied on a non-specific test
prone to false positives. In that circumstance, the defense frequently
endeavors to generate reasonable doubt by pointing out that the
government expert did not employ gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry, the “gold standard of drug testing.”239 “[T]he omitted test

234. See supra Part II (addressing the SODDI defense 2.0).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Nelson, supra note 1.
238. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 108, at 361–67 (5th ed. 2014).
239. There is a detailed discussion of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (“GC” and
“MS”) in 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL,
MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §23.03[c] (5th ed. 2012), LEXIS. GC is a separation
technique. Once the gas chromatograph separates the components of the unknown, the mass
spectrometer fragments the components and specifically identifies each component. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that the identification of an unknown, based on GC/MS analysis,
is “highly accurate.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673 n.2 (1989).
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could be the source of the doubt the defense needs to create in order to
win an acquittal.”240 The defense argues that there is reasonable doubt
because, if the omitted test had been conducted, the result might have
shown that the substance was perfectly lawful.
Decisions such as Alvarez and McCullar will obviously pressure trial
judges to rely on the SODDI defense 2.0. The question is whether
judges should do so. In order to answer that question, we must address
the potential prosecution objections to the legitimacy of the defense.
A. Objection #1: As a Matter of Law, the Inferences Supported by the
Defense Are Too Speculative to Create Reasonable Doubt
At first blush, this objection seems plausible. A prosecutor might
urge that the objection that the inferences arising from the SODDI
defense 2.0 are simply too conjectural to generate reasonable doubt.
The 2.0 version of the defense requires the trier of fact to engage in
more speculation than the traditional version of the doctrine.241 The 2.0
version of the doctrine invites the jurors to conjecture as to what an
investigation into the third party’s possible guilt might have yielded.
Moreover, in a given case, in applying the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, a jury certainly might refuse to find reasonable doubt.
However, the question is not whether the judge should require the jury
to accept the SODDI defense 2.0 and direct an acquittal. Rather, the
question is whether the defense is relevant enough to the jury’s inquiry
that the judge ought to permit the defense to submit the argument to the
jury.
It is submitted that the answer to the latter question is “Yes.”
Cognitive psychology and jury decision-making studies indicate that
during deliberations, juries arrive at a verdict by assessing the relative
plausibility of competing accounts of the litigated events.242 The trier
compares the competing propositions tendered by the opposing
litigants.243 In evaluating the persuasiveness of each proposition, the

240. GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 239, §§ 10-8[c][ii], 10-26-27.
241. Id.
242. Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 604–
05 (1994); see also Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best
Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 224–25 (2008); Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of
Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 596–99 (2013) (discussing alternative explanations);
William Twining, Narrative and Generalizations in Argumentation About Questions of Fact,
FESTSKRIFT TILL STIG STROMHOLM 821, 824–25 (1997) (stating that there is “compelling
evidence that in practice jurors and other triers of fact reach judgments about particular past
events by assessing the plausibility of stories. Jurors, in it said, proceed ‘holistically’ by
comparing competing stories . . . .”).
243. 1 COLIN AITKEN, PAUL ROBERTS & GRAHAM JACKSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF
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trier considers the gaps in the body of evidence supporting the
proposition.244 As Judge Posner has observed, in deciding whether
there is a gap and, if so, how much significance to ascribe to the
existence of the gap, the trier must speculate as to what a reasonable
investigation might have produced.245
Perhaps the best analogy is to the courts’ treatment of testimony
about differential diagnosis and etiology. When an expert testifies to a
differential diagnosis, he or she uses process-of-elimination reasoning to
determine the patient’s illness.246 When the expert opines based on a
differential etiology, the expert employs the same mode of reasoning to
identify the most likely cause of the patient’s condition.247 What
conditions do the courts impose before admitting such testimony? On
the one hand, the courts do not demand that the expert thoroughly
explore every possible illness or cause.248 On the other hand, the courts
insist that the expert undertake a serious249 investigation of at least the
obvious,250 plausible,251 alternative252 explanations.
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 38 (Royal Stat. Soc’y
2010).
244. D.H. Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 657, 658, 664, 666 (1986).
245. United States v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (stating that the
trier may conclude that evidence that should naturally be available is missing because the litigant
“has simply not bothered to conduct an investigation”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1129 (2004).
246. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony About
Differential Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under- and Over-Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 392,
401–02 (2004); see Stanley v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 3d 987, 996–1002 (C.D. Cal.
2014).
247. Imwinkelried, supra note 246, at 402-05; see also Brown v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 765 F.3d 765, 765–70 (7th Cir. 2014); GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 239, § 20.06[gb], at
358–62.
248. Bee v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[W]hile an
expert need not rule out every potential cause in order to satisfy Daubert, the expert’s testimony
must at least address obvious alternative causes and provide a reasonable explanation for
dismissing specific alternate factors identified by the defendant.”); In re Digitek Prod. Liab.
Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 822, 838 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (“[F]ailure to account for all possible causes
does not render expert opinion based on differential diagnosis inadmissible; only if [the] expert
utterly fails to consider alternative causes or fails to explain why the opinion remains sound in
light of alternative causes suggested by the opposing party is [the] expert’s opinion unreliable for
failure to account for all potential causes.” (quoting Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d
257, 265–66 (4th Cir. 1999))), reconsideration denied, No. 2:08–md–01968, 2010 WL 5396377
(S.D.W. Va. Oct. 20, 2010).
249. Gary Sloboda, Differential Diagnosis or Distortion?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 301, 310 (2001).
250. There is a new Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. The Note states: “Courts both before and after Daubert have found other
factors relevant in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered
by the trier of fact. These factors include . . . [w]hether the expert has adequately accounted for
obvious alternative explanations.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (citing Claar v.
Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 501–02 (9th Cir. 1994), and Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d
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In the case of testimony about a differential diagnosis or etiology, the
expert’s failure to seriously investigate plausible alternative
explanations renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible. In the present
context, the accused is arguing that the police failed to undertake a
serious investigation of a third party who was a plausible suspect. If the
parallel to differential diagnosis and etiology continued, the accused
would argue that the police failure renders the prosecution case legally
insufficient and requires a judgment of acquittal. However, the accused
is seeking much less drastic relief than a peremptory ruling. Instead of
moving for a judgment of acquittal,253 the accused is merely seeking
permission to (1) present evidence supporting the defense to the jury
and (2) argue to the jury that the police failure creates a lingering,
reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt. If a failure to adequately
investigate plausible alternative explanations can render a differential
diagnosis altogether inadmissible, the relief the accused seeks appears
modest and reasonable.
However, further analysis indicates that there are some situations in
which the accused should not be entitled to even that relief or in which
the prosecution ought to have the right to present rebuttal evidence.
1. There Were Multiple Perpetrators
Assume that the other evidence in the case establishes that there was
only one perpetrator: the victim testifies that there was only one
assailant, an automated surveillance video shows a solitary burglar, or
there was only one set of footprints approaching and then leaving the
victim’s residence. In those situations, proof of a third party’s guilt
establishes the accused’s innocence.254 In procedural parlance, in this
fact pattern the accused’s hypothesis of a third party’s guilt is “an
element-negating traverse.”255 If there is only one perpetrator, proof of
a third party’s guilt necessarily negates an essential element of the
129 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
251. Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis
Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive
Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 128 (2001).
252. Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., LLC, 766 F.3d 1296, 1309 (11th Cir. 2014);
Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., 346 F.3d 987, 999-1000 (10th Cir. 2003).
253. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), governs when the accused makes such a
motion. The accused has the difficult task of persuading the judge or court that given the state of
the record, any rational juror would necessarily have a reasonable, lingering doubt about the
accused’s guilt. It is one thing to convince a juror that there is such a doubt. It is quite a different
matter to convince a judge or court that there is necessarily such a doubt.
254. E.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 297 (1973).
255. People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 556 (Colo. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2429
(2012).
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prosecution’s case against the accused. The hypotheses of the accused’s
guilt and that of the third party are mutually exclusive; simply stated, if
one is true, the other must be false.
Several cases discussing the SODDI defense have made the point that
in multiple perpetrator cases, the police failure to investigate a third
party’s guilt does not undermine the prosecution’s case to the same
extent that it does when there is a single perpetrator. The guilt of the
third party might be completely consistent with the accused’s guilt. In
one multiple perpetrator case, the court asserted that proof of a similar
rape by a third party did not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about the
accused’s guilt.256 In a second multiple perpetrator situation, the court
declared that proof of the third party’s guilt would “in no way negate[]
or diminish[] the defendant’s culpability as the actual shooter.”257 In a
third case, the court excluded evidence of a third party’s flight for the
stated reason that it had little probative value “where, as here, there can
be more than one guilty party.”258
It would be an overstatement in these cases to dismiss the evidence of
the third party’s guilt as absolutely irrelevant. There is always the
possibility that when the police tracked down the third party, he or she
would not only confess their guilt but also establish the accused’s
innocence.
However, the third-party culpability evidence has
considerably less probative value in multiple perpetrator cases. When
the other evidence in the case clearly demonstrates that there were
multiple perpetrators, the trial judge should at least have a measure of
discretion under Rule 403 in determining the admissibility of testimony
to support a SODDI defense 2.0.
2. The Third Party Was Not a Plausible Suspect
Now assume that there was only one perpetrator. Even in this
situation, there ought to be limits on the availability of the SODDI
defense 2.0. If the police conduct anything approaching a thorough
investigation of a serious felony, the investigation is likely to turn up
tens or hundreds of names—the victim’s relatives, neighbors,
coworkers, and acquaintances. The police have limited time and
resources, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to thoroughly

256. People v. Avila, 133 P.3d 1076, 1136 (Cal. 2006), modified (Aug. 2, 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1306 (2007).
257. People v. Vines, 251 P.3d 943 (Cal. 2011), modified (Aug. 10, 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1539 (2012).
258. United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 413 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Tietjen v.
United States, 534 U.S. 935 (2001); see also Allen v. State, 103 A.3d 700, 711 (Md. 2014) (“the
incident involved multiple persons”).
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investigate the possible guilt of every person whose name surfaced.
The SODDI defense 2.0 pressures the police to spend precious time and
resources investigating third parties; and in deciding when the defense
is apropos, courts should distinguish among the possible, the probable,
and the plausible.259
At one extreme, it should not suffice that there is a bare possibility of
the third party’s guilt of the crime charged. Again, it would be
objectively unreasonable to expect the police to investigate every person
whose name is mentioned in passing during the investigation. That
standard would be undesirable as a matter of criminal justice policy,
since it would pressure the police to waste time and resources.
At the other extreme, the accused should not be required to
demonstrate that the police had sufficient information to establish the
probability of the third party’s guilt.260 Ultimately, the government has
the burden of proving the accused’s identity as the perpetrator beyond a
reasonable doubt.261 In Judge Weinstein’s famous survey of his
colleagues’ understanding of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” most
of the federal district court judges responded that the standard required
the establishment of a probability of guilt at least exceeding 75%.262 In
a single perpetrator situation in which proof of the third party’s guilt
exonerates the accused, in principle, the allocation of the ultimate
burden of proof to the government should preclude requiring the
accused to establish a 50% probability of the third party’s guilt.263
In contrast to either possibility or probability, plausibility is an
appropriate standard. In McCullar, the court held that the accused has a
right to present an exculpatory story when it is “plausible.”264 The facts
of McCullar and Alvarez exemplify the sort of facts that the defense

259. The Supreme Court drew the same distinction in another context. In its landmark
pleading decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court distinguished among pleaded facts that possibly establish liability,
those that would probably establish fault, and those sufficient to plausibly point to liability. The
Court ruled that to be legally sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must state “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Abuhamdan v.
Blyth, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 175, 187 (D. Conn. 2014); Quinn v. Walgreen, 958 F. Supp. 2d 533,
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
260. See generally People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1986), reh’g denied, (June 26, 1986).
261. See id.
262. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403–04, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 603 F.2d
1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
263. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Reach of Winship: Invalidating Evidentiary
Admissibility Standards That Undermine the Prosecution’s Obligation to Prove the Defendant’s
Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 70 UMKC L. Rev. 865, 871–72, 880–81 (2002).
264. State v. McCullar, 335 P.3d 900, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
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must present in order to demonstrate that a third party was a plausible
suspect.265 In Alvarez, the defense evidence took the form of both
motive and opportunity to commit the charged crime: Julio Guerrero
evidently thought that Colon had argued with Guerrero’s wife,266 and
Guerrero lived near the site of the shooting.267 In Judge Calabresi’s
words, when the police received reports containing those facts, that
information should have made Guerrero “a person of interest” in their
minds.268 In McCullar, the defense’s evidence included testimony
relating to both motive and Finch’s commission of an uncharged crime
“remarkably similar”269 to the charged crime: she wanted money for
drugs,270 and she had previously assaulted another man by shoving him
onto a bed and threatening to slash him with a pair of scissors.271 When
the police gained that information, they had a “credible tip[]” that they
should have pursued more diligently.272
The McCullar court used apt language when it stated that the accused
had succeeded in “rais[ing] an evidence-based doubt” about Finch’s
guilt.273 In a single perpetrator case, when the accused shows that the
police had reports indicating that the third party had a strong motive to
commit the charged crime, an opportunity to do so shared by only a few
persons, or a unique means to perpetrate the crime, the third party is not
merely one of “the usual suspects” in the grand tradition of
Casablanca.274 Without more those facts might not suffice to support a
traditional SODDI defense,275 but they give the police good reason to
spend time and resources investigating the third party’s potential guilt
of the charged crime.
3. In Retrospect, It Is Clear that the Third Party Did Not Commit the
Charged Crime
Assume arguendo that before trial the police received a report
containing sufficient facts about a third party to make it reasonable for
them to investigate the third party’s guilt. On that assumption, the
265. See generally People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2429 (2012).
266. Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2014).
267. Id. at 227.
268. Id. at 231.
269. McCullar, 335 P.3d at 909.
270. Id. at 903–05, 909.
271. Id. at 909–10 (referencing “a similar altercation only months before Bedolla’s murder”).
272. Id. at 907.
273. Id. at 908.
274. Id. at 907.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 55–62.
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accused is entitled to rely on a SODDI defense 2.0 at trial. However,
even on that assumption, an error by the police would be harmless if a
thorough investigation would have yielded the conclusion that the third
party was innocent. If the police sense that the accused intends to
mount a SODDI defense 2.0, it would be permissible for them to
conduct that investigation after the fact. It should be immaterial
whether the police conducted that investigation before or after the filing
of charges. Whatever the timing of the investigation, the results of the
investigation would effectively rebut the SODDI defense 2.0 if the
investigation demonstrated the third party’s innocence.
In a given case, though, there may have been such a lengthy delay
between the commission of the charged crime and the subsequent police
investigation that the prosecution evidence of the investigation does not
fully rebut the SODDI defense. If there was a substantial time lapse,
evidence of the third party’s guilt may have been lost. In that situation,
the accused should still be permitted to raise the SODDI defense 2.0. In
any event, the initial, unreasonable police failure to investigate could
still be logically relevant and admissible to show the bias of any
investigator who testified at trial.276
B. Objection #2: It Is Wrong-Minded to Recognize a SODDI Defense
2.0 with Such Minimal Requirements
As an alternative objection, a prosecutor might urge that the
requirements for the SODDI defense 2.0 are unduly minimal compared
to the requirements for the traditional SODDI defense. Part I described
the traditional SODDI defense in which the accused proffers evidence
that a third party committed the crime that the accused is charged with.
As we saw in Part I, the case law on the traditional defense generally
requires the accused to present a certain quantum of proof of the third
party’s involvement in the charged crime. In particular, Part I noted
that courts routinely hold that without more, proof of neither the third
party’s motive nor his or her opportunity suffices to support the
traditional defense; the trial judge can exclude the defense evidence.277
The cases also limit the types of evidence that the accused may rely
on.278 To begin with, courts apply the hearsay rule to reports about the

276. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1984) (showing that although Article VI of
the Federal Rules of Evidence makes no mention of bias impeachment, it is still permissible to
use that impeachment technique in federal practice; the credibility of witnesses is a fact of
consequence under Federal Rule 401, and Rule 402 is therefore adequate authorization for the
continued use of the impeachment technique).
277. See supra Part I.
278. Id.
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third party because the accused is offering the reports for their truth, that
is, to prove that in fact the third party perpetrated the charged offense.279
Moreover, when the accused tries to introduce evidence that the third
party committed other offenses similar to the charged crime, courts
enforce the character evidence prohibition.280 The accused may not use
the evidence as a basis for inferring the third party’s propensity to
commit offenses similar to the charged crime; instead, the accused must
identify a non-character theory of logical relevance to satisfy Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2).
Part II compared and contrasted the SODDI defense 2.0. In this
version of the defense, the accused makes a more limited contention;
the accused asserts that reasonable doubt exists because the police
neglected to adequately investigate reports pointing to the third party’s
guilt.281 Part II pointed out that proof of either the third party’s motive
or opportunity could arguably suffice to make the third party a person of
interest whom the police should investigate.282 Furthermore, Part II
explained that the defense evidence proffered to support the SODDI
defense 2.0 does not face the same hearsay and character hurdles that
handicap the traditional defense.283 The defense testimony about the
reports submitted to the police is non-hearsay under Rule 801(c). The
defense offers the testimony for the limited purpose of showing the
effect of the reports on the state of mind of the police investigators;
having received the reports, the police should have been motivated to
probe the third party’s possible guilt of the charged crime. In addition,
the testimony is not subject to the character evidence prohibition that
restricts the traditional SODDI defense. Under the 2.0 version of the
defense, the ultimate inference is not the third party’s conduct; the
accused is not proffering the reports to show that the third party acted in
conformity with a disposition toward criminal conduct. Rather, as in
“communicated character” self-defense cases in which the accused has
received reports about the alleged victim’s violent character, the
ultimate inference is state of mind: the officer’s receipt of the report
ought to put the officer on notice that the third party is a person of
interest who should be investigated.284
This state of the law might strike a prosecutor as paradoxical—or
even nonsensical. A traditional SODDI defense has more probative
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 229–32 and accompanying text.

IMWINKELRIED (91-129)[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

SODDI Defense 2.0

10/9/15 6:24 PM

127

value in establishing the accused’s innocence. When the accused can
make out that defense, the accused has admissible evidence tending to
show the third party’s guilt. In contrast, when an accused relies on the
SODDI defense 2.0, the accused may not have a shred of admissible
evidence of the third party’s guilt. The accused may have only out-ofcourt reports that the third party was involved in the charged crime or
perpetrated a similar, uncharged offense. A prosecutor might protest
that it is absurd to shackle the more probative theory with relatively
strict requirements while permitting the accused to invoke a weaker
defense that is largely free of such restrictions.
On reflection, however, this state of the law—in particular, the
differential treatment of the traditional SODDI defense and the 2.0
version—is rational and defensible.
It is true that a traditional defense lends stronger support to the
hypothesis that the accused is innocent. A SODDI defense 2.0 is
inherently more speculative, since the jury must conjecture as to what
an investigation of the third party’s guilt would have revealed.
However, there is nothing fallacious about concluding that like a
traditional defense, the 2.0 version of the defense can generate
reasonable doubt. Although it is impermissible for the judge or
attorneys to quantify the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for the
jury,285 there is a general understanding among experienced trial judges
that jurors treat the standard as requiring at least a 75% probability of
guilt.286 Indeed, in Judge Weinstein’s survey, most of the responding
federal district court judges stated that they believed that the jurors
roughly equate proof beyond a reasonable doubt with a 90% probability
of guilt.287 If a traditional SODDI defense prompted the jurors to
conclude that there was a 30% probability of the third party’s guilt and
the SODDI defense 2.0 led the jurors to believe that there was only a
15% probability, both defenses would pass the threshold and produce
acquittals.
Common sense suggests that the accused has a much better chance of
gaining an acquittal under a traditional SODDI defense than under the

285. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 146, § 2916 (explaining courts are reluctant to permit
any amplification of the general instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Many appellate
courts even forbid the judge from telling the jury that it is the standard that a layperson would use
in making the most important decisions in his or her life. In these jurisdictions, any attempt to tell
the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt equated with a certain probability of guilt would be
anathema. Id.
286. See supra text accompanying note 262–63.
287. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 2d 388, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 603 F.2d 1053
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
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2.0 version of the defense. Again, the latter version of the defense
entails much more speculation. In Alvarez, in the closing argument the
prosecutor accurately characterized the defense theory as
“speculation.”288 That characterization may well ring true with a lay
jury. Admittedly, it is easier for the defense to mount a SODDI defense
2.0 than to marshal the admissible evidence to present the traditional
version of the defense. However, when the accused is forced to resort
to the 2.0 version of the defense, as a practical matter the defense has a
much lower chance of securing an acquittal. In that light, there is
nothing illogical or unfair about the courts’ differential treatment of the
two versions of the defense.
CONCLUSION
The recognition of the emerging, 2.0 version of the SODDI defense is
an important development for several reasons. The defense bar will
certainly welcome the advent of the defense. As Part I noted, there are
significant quantitative and qualitative limitations on the evidence
usable to substantiate the traditional SODDI defense.289 The 2.0 version
of the defense is largely free of those limitations.290 Hence, the defense
can invoke the defense even in situations in which it would be
impossible to mount the traditional defense.
Much more importantly, though, the emergence of the defense is a
salutary development for the criminal justice system. In the past three
decades, there has been a growing realization that wrongful convictions
are far more common than we once comfortably assumed. To date,
there have been over 300 DNA exonerations.291 There have been
numerous reform proposals to reduce the incidence of such miscarriages
of justice. More and more jurisdictions guarantee the accused pre- and
post-conviction DNA testing.292 A number of states have revised lineup
procedures to lower the risk of mistaken eyewitness identifications.293
Likewise, there have been initiatives to improve the state of forensic
science to curb the danger that flawed expert testimony may lead to a
288. Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 2014).
289. See supra Part I.
290. See generally People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2429 (2012).
291. Myron Beldock, Leon Friedman & Lewis M. Steel, The Death of the “Hurricane” and
the Criminal Justice System’s Failures, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 28, 2014, at 47; DNA Exonerations
Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 15, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://www.innocenceproject
.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.
292. GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 239, § 18.01, at 6–13.
293. 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 239, § 9.02[b]; Thomas P. Sullivan, Illinois Enacts
Eyewitness Identification Reforms, CHAMPION, Sept. 2014, at 58.
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wrongful conviction.294
However, in the final analysis, the best protection against
miscarriages of justice is a well-trained police force that is determined
to resist the temptation to “rush to judgment.” The best mechanism to
maximize the number of guilty persons convicted as well as the number
of innocent persons acquitted is a law enforcement community highly
motivated to investigate every suspect who is a plausible person of
interest. The judicial recognition of the SODDI defense 2.0 can supply
such motivation. For that matter, the constitutionalization of the
defense, as in Alvarez and McCullar, can significantly strengthen that
motivation.

294. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 210, 266 (2009).

